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Introduction
The “Burmese Spring” came as a surprise to many ob-
servers. After nearly two decades in power, Senior Gen-
eral Than Shwe (1992–2011), chairman of the ruling State 
Peace and Development Council (1992–2011) resigned 
and handed over power to a civilian government under 
the leadership of the newly elected President Thein Sein. 
When the latter promised far-reaching political reforms 
nobody believed the President who had himself been a 
member of the ruling military council. However, Thein 
Sein did introduce many political reforms in the first 
two and half years, such as the reconciliation with the 
political opposition under the leadership of Nobel Peace 
Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, the release of many 
political prisoners and the expansion of civil rights and 
liberties. Thein Sein also launched a new peace initiative 
and promised a political dialogue to the ethnic groups 
of the multi-ethnic state. The reforms are not the result 
of a weak or factionalized military but are the product 
of a policy of strength. In the last decade the military 
has set up new institutions that will safeguard the in-
terests of the military in the future, such as a new con-
stitution which provides for military representation 
in Parliament, the cabinet and the dominant party, the 
Myanmar’s liberalizing reforms initiated by President Thein Sein after ta-
king office in March 2011 are raising high hopes of peace and democracy in 
the country. Progress, after nearly three years, has however been uneven: 
there have been positive developments in the area of press freedom, with 
regard to political prisoners and in dealing with the political opposition. At 
the same time the dialogue with ethnic groups has stagnated and ethnic and 
religious violence has escalated. This Asia Policy Brief critically assesses the 
reform policy and weighs up the chances of democratization of the long-time 
military regime. 
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 Whether the truce between the government and the 
opposition survives mainly depends on the outcome of 
the constitutional revisions and the elections at the end 
of 2015. The NLD is currently the most important political 
force in the country and has good chances of winning in 
free and fair elections at the end of 2015. However, two 
decades of military rule and harsh repression will have 
made an impact on the opposition. 
 The party is facing criticism due to the old age of the 
party leadership, the lack of knowledge of the young party 
cadres and the undemocratic party structures. It thrives, 
however, on the charisma of its leader. For Aung San Suu 
Kyi to become President, a constitutional amendment would 
be required. The opposition leader has therefore increasing-
ly sought to close ranks with the military. She attended last 
year's military parade on the day of the armed forces and 
has stressed the importance of the military to the public. 
 This shows that Aung San Suu Kyi has abandoned 
her hardline stance towards the quasi-military system 
and has adopted a more moderate tone in order to find 
a compromise with the military for further democratiza-
tion. This pact, which could provide the military with a 
political role for the next few years and could allow Aung 
San Suu Kyi to be elected President, would be a major 
breakthrough in the democratization process. The truce 
between the regime and the opposition, however, would 
be jeopardized if there were no further reforms. 
New liberties
The former military regimes ruled with an iron fist and a 
high degree of repression for decades. The media and the 
press were heavily censored and gatherings of more than 
five people were banned. Protests were not tolerated and 
were forcibly dissolved as witnessed during the student 
demonstrations in 1996 or the peaceful monks’ demon-
strations in 2007. The liberalization has, however, created 
an entirely new and more open climate and enlarged po-
litical spaces for civil society considerably.
"Union Solidarity and Development Party" which is very 
close to the military. The policy has two main objectives: 
1) The purpose of the new institutions is to provide 
checks and balances and guarantee stability in order to 
facility a leadership change within the military. The old 
guard went into (safe) retirement and was replaced by a 
second, younger cohort with Thein Sein as head of gov-
ernment, Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann and Senior 
General Min Aung Hlaing as Armed Forces Commander 
at the top of the new, mutually-controlling institutions. 
A younger cohort of soldiers could also rise within the 
ranks without generating the danger of a military coup. 
2) The dependence on China which was considered a 
threat by the nationalist leadership was to be reduced by 
a reorientation of foreign policy and by allowing an open-
ing to the West to bring about economic modernization 
and to close the gap to the other countries in the region. 
The reform policy therefore can be seen as a recalibra-
tion of domestic and external relations. 
Truce with the opposition
The first step in Thein Sein’s reform strategy was to start 
a dialogue with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Without collaborating with the democracy leader an open-
ing to the outside world would not have been possible. A 
period of confidence-building measures started which en-
couraged Aung San Suu Kyi to rethink her principal hard-
line opposition against the regime. At the beginning of 
January 2012 the Political Party Law and the Election Law 
was changed to allow the “National League for Democ-
racy” (NLD) to participate in future elections. The NLD 
was re-registered and in April 2012, won 43 out the 44 
possible seats in the relatively free and fair by-elections. 
Although the NLD was unable to initiate a far-reaching 
democratization of the political system, it acts, nonethe-
less as a government-in-waiting and seeks to bring about 
peace and reconciliation, deepen the rule of law and initi-
ate constitutional reforms. 
3tempt by students to commemorate the 50th anniversary 
of the protests at the University of Yangon (during the 
demonstrations in 1962, a dozen students were killed). 
 On the whole it is apparent that especially those pro-
tests are prohibited that harm the government’s reputa-
tion at the international level or which are against the 
military’s economic interests. In November 2012, secu-
rity forces suppressed a protest by villagers against the 
expansion of a copper mine in Letpadaung /Monywa. 
More than 70 demonstrators were injured in the protests 
against the Chinese-Burmese joint venture. In addition, 
several civil society activists were arrested. The govern-
ment issued a public apology and set up a commission 
of inquiry chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, whose task it 
was to decide the future of the mine. The commission rec-
ommended the expansion of the mine, but the protests 
continue. The example shows two trends: 1) NGOs and 
civil society groups have much more freedom nowadays 
compared to the past, which they use to organize protests 
and voice criticism. 2) If the protest actions are not in the 
interests of powerful (military) conglomerates or state in-
terests, they are suppressed. 
Political prisoners
According to estimates by human rights organizations, 
the number of political prisoners remained around 1,100. 
These prisoners were mainly members of the NLD, stu-
dents or members of the ethnic groups. A prime example 
was opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who spent 16 of 
the last 23 years under house arrest. Since 2011 President 
Thein Sein has issued 15 amnesties and has released a to-
tal of 29,601 prisoners which include, according to infor-
mation provided by the Assistance Association for Politi-
cal Prisoners Burma (AAPPB), 1,071 political prisoners. 
 In February 2013, the President set up a committee 
of members of the opposition and former political prison-
ers (such as the 1988 student generation) to discuss the 
release of the remaining political prisoners. The commit-
Freedom of the media and assembly
The media is freer today than ever before. In the last three 
years, Internet and press controls were relaxed. In Au-
gust 2012, the government abolished pre-publication cen-
sorship and thereby lost an important tool of controlling 
the press. The abolition of censorship, the release of im-
prisoned reporters and the opening of press offices of the 
exile media in the capital have created a completely new 
environment for the media. This can be seen in the inter-
national rankings for press freedom. Myanmar has now 
moved up from 174th place (2011) to 151th place (2013) in 
the Reporters Without Borders report. 
 Despite this opening, restrictions still apply. Accord-
ing to government guidelines the press cannot report 
on security related issues, corruption, ethnic issues and 
cannot criticize the government. In the past these guide-
lines were sometimes used to restrict press freedom. In 
July 2012, for example, two magazines were banned af-
ter they had speculated on possible cabinet changes. The 
American TIME Magazine was taken out of circulation 
twice after it had reported critically about radical monks 
in the country. In addition, older laws are still in effect 
that carry prison terms for the dissemination of certain 
information. Journalists are worried that these laws may 
be applied again if there were a change in the political 
climate. On the whole, the press is much freer than before 
despite the given constraints. 
 The right of assembly was also expanded. President 
Thein Sein introduced a new law in December 2011 that 
permitted demonstrations under restricted conditions. 
Organizers must inform the authorities five days in ad-
vance and the authorities have the right to prohibit the 
demonstrations. The law provides for a prison sentence 
of one year for unauthorized demonstrations. In recent 
years, Myanmar has seen numerous small scale demon-
strations such as the protests in May 2012 against energy 
shortages in Yangon and Mandalay. At the same time the 
authorities forbade many demonstrations such as the at-
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tion for Political Prisoners Burma (AAPPB) more than 57 
people have been arrested for violating the assembly law 
since December 2011. 
Reconciliation with the ethnic groups
President Thein Sein also launched a new peace initia-
tive that would reduce the distrust of the country’s ethnic 
groups. Myanmar is one of the most ethnically and reli-
giously diverse countries in the world. There are a total 
of over 130 ethno-linguistic groups. The mostly Buddhist 
tee has so far failed to agree on a definition of the term 
"political prisoner" and on the number of detained prison-
ers. During his visit to the United Kingdom in July 2013, 
Thein Sein reiterated his promise to release all political 
prisoners that are still being detained. At the end of the 
year 2013 the President’s office proclaimed that there are 
no political prisoners anymore. Critics, however, claim 
that the number of political prisoners is rising again as 
the government is imprisoning all those that violate the 
new assembly law. According to the Assistance Associa-
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Figure 1: Ethnic Composition in Myanmar (Rough Estimate)
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5eral military offensives against one of the strongest rebel 
armies in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Organi-
zation. Only in October 2013, a new peace agreement be-
tween the government and the rebel organizations was 
signed. There were also skirmishes in Shan State and the 
Kayin area. 
 Decades of fighting on both sides have created a cli-
mate of distrust. The ethnic groups continue to harbor 
great reservations about the government. The latter de-
mands that the ethnic groups abandon their secessionist 
struggle, recognize the constitution, give up fighting and 
integrate into the national army. The ethnic groups, how-
ever, have not found a common voice with most of them 
demanding a rewriting or serious revision of the con-
stitution, the establishment of a truly federal state with 
a federally structured army. So far both sides have not 
been able to reconcile. Political talks have however be-
gun, which bring together the government with the par-
ties in conflict. A debate on federalism has been ongoing 
for many years in Myanmar without it being clear, so far, 
what type of federal arrangement is preferred. The Joint 
Committee for Reviewing the Constitution that was set up 
in July 2013 will also discuss these issues. 
Liberalization, nationalist 
mobilization and violence: 
The dark side of the transition
Myanmar’s political liberalization caused an escalation 
of the long-simmering conflict between Buddhists and 
the Muslim Rohingya in the Rakhine state on the border 
with Bangladesh. The fighting between Buddhists and 
Muslims so far has led to 2,000 dead and 140,000 IDPs. 
In June 2012, the President declared a state of emergency 
and ordered the army to the crisis zone. In 2013, the vio-
lence spread to Central Myanmar. 
 There are many reasons for this surge in violence. 
The Muslim Rohingya are not treated as part of the na-
tion state as they only entered the country in several 
Burmese make up about two-thirds of the population, 
while the various ethnic groups make up about a third 
of the 55 million total population. The largest minority 
groups are the Shan (9 %), the Kayin (7 %), followed by the 
Rakhine (3.5 %), Chin (2.5 %), Mon (2 %) and Kachin (1.5 %). 
In the wake of independence, various minority groups 
agreed to the establishment of the Union of Burma at the 
Panglong Conference in 1947 on the condition that they 
would receive a high degree of autonomy. 
 However, in the early years of independence there 
was an increasing centralization of political power in the 
capital. When President U Nu decided to make Buddhism 
the state religion, most of the country’s ethnic groups 
took up arms to fight for independence. Consequently, 
in the late 1950s most of the ethnic groups were already 
fighting the central government. In the 1990s the govern-
ment was able to sign a number of ceasefires with some 
of the ethnic groups, which resulted in less fighting and a 
cold peace. Cursory fighting between the ethnic militias 
and the Burmese army led to massive human rights vio-
lations and a large number of refugees. Inside Myanmar 
and the neighboring countries there were sometimes up 
to 600,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). 
 Thein Sein started a new initiative to solve the prob-
lem, too. He promised a political dialogue without any 
preconditions and concluded a peace agreement with 17 
of the 18 fighting ethnic groups. On the one hand, Thein 
Sein’s peace initiative is a reason for optimism as the re-
lease of political prisoners, the growing space for ethnic 
political parties and media as well as the decentralization 
of political power provides more opportunities for ethnic 
minorities. Moreover, this is a drastic departure from the 
assimilation policies of earlier governments. But on the 
other hand, the continuing human rights violations by the 
army in the ethnic minority areas and the escalation of 
hostilities beg the question whether the army really sup-
ports the reform initiatives of the President. From June 
2011 until February 2013, the military embarked on sev-
6January 2014    Asia Policy Brief    2014 | 01
did so only hesitantly during the peak of violence. Accord-
ing to rumors, hard-liners in the military are trying to 
block the process of political reform in the country. So far 
there has been no evidence for these claims. 
The role of the military 
in times of change
The military no longer rules directly, but still has an im-
mense indirect influence. According to the constitution, 
the military has a leading role in politics together with 
the political parties in Parliament and the President. This 
leadership role can be seen in its representation in the 
national parliament where 25 of the seats are reserved 
for the military. In addition, numerous cabinet posts are 
reserved for the military, especially all ministries for 
security-related affairs such as the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Ministry of Border Affairs and the Ministry 
of Defense. The military’s influence on day-to-day poli-
cies has declined significantly since civilian institutions 
have gained in power. This is also the case with the po-
litical parties in Parliament and the President. They have 
shaped the reform policies of recent years. In the last 
three years, NGOs, trade and farmer associations had a 
far bigger influence on the debates than the military and 
its parliamentary representatives. 
 The military budget was significantly reduced in re-
cent years (although it still makes up the biggest portion 
of the budget) while spending on welfare and health has 
risen. The military, however, can still rely on an emergen-
cy law, it regulates its own affairs autonomously without 
the influence of civilian politicians. Furthermore, there 
is no accountability for past human rights violations. All 
in all, the military still is the dominant actor which oper-
ates as a guardian behind the scenes. The recent reforms, 
however, have also resulted in an open debate about the 
political role of the armed forces. 
immigration waves after the country gained independ-
ence in 1948. Already in the 1970s and 1990s there were 
pogroms against the Muslim minority. The region is 
among the poorest in Myanmar and the Rohingya have 
been discriminated against for decades and the govern-
ment denies them full citizenship. Even the Commission 
appointed by President Thein Sein in August 2012 failed 
to systematically investigate the violence. Instead it re-
commended to better equip the security forces in order 
to respond more effectively to future crises. It also recom-
mended limiting the births among Muslims to two chil-
dren to stop population growth in the region. The UN Hu-
man Rights Commission has issued a recommendation to 
grant the Rohingya, Burmese citizenship. This proposal, 
however, is not supported by the Burmese majority. 
 The violence against Muslims in Central Myanmar 
should also be understood in the context of a growing 
nationalism and the influence of radical monks. Hate 
speech is a concern with the so-called 969 movement 
calling for intolerance and the boycott of Muslim busi-
ness. Although Muslims constitute only four percent of 
the total population, the fear of being overrun with immi-
grant Muslims is widespread. Social networks are used to 
propagate nationalist slogans and hate speeches. Radical 
monks distribute nationalist propaganda DVDs. After the 
July 2013 issue of TIME portrayed the radical Buddhist 
monk Wirathu as the “Face of Terror” and as a Buddhist 
“Bin Laden” in their cover story, dozens of monks took to 
the streets in Yangon. The government took the issue of 
the magazine off the market but did nothing to seriously 
counter the nationalist propaganda. Buddhist monks also 
protested against the visit of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) in Yangon. 
 Liberalization is generally promoting mobilization 
along ethnic and religious lines. The ethnic and religious 
unrest is the biggest obstacle on the road to democracy. 
Conspiracy theorists refer in this context to the involve-
ment of the armed forces who were late to intervene and 
7ment can be approved in a referendum. It is a very tight 
time frame until the elections take place at the end of 
2015 and the outlook for a thorough overhaul of the con-
stitution are dim. The current constellations of actors and 
their interests do not bode well for a thorough revision of 
the constitution. The ruling USDP party has announced 
that it does not intend to make any radical reforms – par-
ty leader (and Lower House speaker) Thura Shwe Mann 
has also voiced the support of opening up the presiden-
cy for Aung San Suu Kyi. President Thein Sein has an-
nounced his support for an amendment of the constitu-
tion. It remains to be seen whether their input will allow 
for more than cosmetic reforms. The military is a veto 
actor and can block the constitutional amendments. As 
guardian of the nation state it will wait for the outcome 
of the political negotiations between the government and 
the ethnic groups (scheduled for February) before agree-
ing to any constitutional amendments. The prospects for 
a fast democratization are thus rather bleak. If there is 
no agreement between the military, the opposition and 
the ethnic groups, a far-reaching democratization would 
only be possible after the elections in 2015 and a new 
distribution of power in Parliament. The international 
community should therefore focus on supporting the 
state-building process and to guarantee the fairness of 
the 2015 elections. 
Constitutional reforms: Standstill 
or pacted democratization?
Myanmar is currently at a critical juncture. Whether the 
country will embark on the road to democracy largely de-
pends on whether the Joint Committee for Reviewing the 
Constitution finds a political compromise. The 109-mem-
ber committee which represents all political parties was 
set up in late July 2013. The ruling party and the military 
have a majority: the USDP has 52 members, the armed 
forces 25, whereas the NLD only has seven. The most im-
portant reform issues for a further democratization are: 
1) The question whether Aung San Suu Kyi can become 
President: the constitution currently states that candi-
dates whose spouses or children are citizens of a for-
eign country are denied the right to run for the presi-
dency or vice-presidency (Article 59f). This clause is 
particularly relevant in the case of Aung San Suu Sky, 
as she was married to a British man and they have two 
sons. If this particular clause in the constitution is not 
revised, the chances of the NLD in the 2015 elections 
would be reduced. The NLD recently stated that it will 
field candidates in the elections even if reforms do not 
materialize. 
2) The introduction of a truly federal system. Nearly all 
ethnic groups are calling for the introduction of a fed-
eral system. The constitution in its present form only 
provides for a decentralization of power in a unitarian 
context. The idea of power sharing in the context of a 
federal state is a concept which is alien to the military. 
3) The role of the military: Negotiations about the role of 
the military, its representation in Parliament and the 
Cabinet are also currently under way. 
 The Joint Committee for Reviewing the Constitution 
will submit a report at the end of January 2014. Parlia-
ment then needs to agree on a constitutional amendment 
with a majority of 75 percent of the votes before the docu-
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